It is difficult to describe the tradition of liberty present in the former Nobles’ Commonwealth without making a reference to republicanism, especially if we consider the centrepiece of republicanism to be the ideal of liberty understood as a privilege that requires joint action by citizens. It was from similar concepts that the ideal of a republic as a community of free and equal people must have emerged – of all those citizens belonging to the nobility who wrote the laws and elected the king “for themselves”. This ideal effectively dominated the Polish public debate from the end of the 16th and the beginning of the 17th century onwards and did not fade into insignificance in later times either.
The Polish republican tradition was of course not wholly homogeneous or coherent. Still, we can look for signs of continuation within it or even describe it in terms of evolution. However, in the 18th century, this tradition seemed to have reached the limits of its development potential, and it faced major challenges. It may be claimed that a major re-evaluation in this respect occurred during the Four-Year Sejm (1788–1792), and ultimately during the Kościuszko Uprising (1794); reasons for the changes lay in the clash between the former ideals of noble liberty (even when they were provocatively questioned) and the intellectual currents and intuitions of the Enlightenment. It is significant that the latter currents and intuitions influenced not only the representatives of the reformist camp, but also those writers who were ideologically opposed to the Enlightenment – the so-called noble republicans. Upon a closer look, however, this observation should not come as a surprise: after all, critics of the reform camp, or at least the most original writers among them, considered themselves disciples of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the author of the famous Considérations sur le gouvernement de Pologne (“Considerations on the Government of Poland”).
However, I would like to argue here that the development of the Polish republican tradition could have been accelerated primarily by the most prominent reformist writers (Hugo Kołłątaj and Stanisław Staszic, and later also Tadeusz Kościuszko) who had a broader understanding of liberty, which was supposed to cover all citizens and be more or less derived from the idea of natural rights. Staszic and Kołłątaj could possibly have gone too far in their concessions to the royalist position, perhaps risking the loss of important components of the republican identity. Still, the concept of liberty and citizenship they presented offered hope that the greatest challenges that faced the republicanism growing out of the tradition of an estate-based society could be overcome. [Theses and research conclusions that concern ideas from the time of the Four-Year Sejm have been developed in more detail in my book W poszukiwaniu prawdziwej rzeczypospolitej. Główne nurty myśli politycznej Sejmu Czteroletniego (“In Search of the True Republic. Main Currents of Political Thought in the Four-Year Sejm”) (Kraków 2015) and also in my article entitled “Polish Republicanism of the Four Year Seym at a Doctrinal Crossroads”, History of European Ideas, vol. 43, 2017, pp. 762–775]. The latter tradition, which was burdened with social limitations that are difficult to justify in retrospect, and was unable to cope with external threats as a result, had no good prospects. Western writers, who did not always favour republican ideals, were well aware of these shortcomings of so-called aristocratic republics and criticised them. In particular, they observed that in republics of this kind, a considerable part of the society may enjoy less personal freedom than under monarchies. Both Staszic and Kołłątaj were close to finding a way for republicanism to escape from such traps, although their innovations came at the expense of some doctrinal concessions. Kościuszko no longer had to make these concessions, although insurrectionary conditions were not conducive to the development of political theories. In any case, weaknesses in the arguments put forward by opponents of reforms can be seen from this perspective, even if on other issues (although not those which should have prompted them to deeper social reflections) those opponents were to prove more faithful disciples of Rousseau.
I propose to start this analysis precisely with Kościuszko and the hopes that his 1794 uprising opened before Poland and the Polish republican tradition [Kościuszko’s republican stance presented here was discussed in more detail in my paper Tadeusza Kościuszki model patriotyzmu a problemy tożsamości narodowych na ziemiach Rzeczypospolitej Obojga Narodów (“Tadeusz Kościuszko’s Model of Patriotism and the Issue of National Identities in the Territories of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth”) (Sixth International Congress of Belarusian Studies, Kaunas, Lithuania, 7–9 October 2016) and in The Evolution of Republicanism and the Prospects of „Civil Religion” and Religious Pluralism in Late Eighteenth-Century Poland (2017 Conference of the International Society for Intellectual History, “The Rethinking of Religious Belief in the Making of Modernity”, Blagoevgrad, Bulgaria, 30 May–1 June 2017)]. Of most importance for the topic at issue here is the fact that the commander-in-chief of the uprising was already fully convinced that the success of the Polish cause depended entirely on the readiness of the entire population, or at least of a large part of it, to support the struggle. This idea was succinctly expressed in Kościuszko’s famous and often-quoted statement: “I will not fight for the nobility alone”. This could easily be explained in terms of Kościuszko’s refusal to accept a republic that was owned exclusively by the nobles and preserved the former privileges (liberties) of a single estate at the expense of restricting the cities’ rights and of retaining serfdom. However, it expressed something more in fact. Obviously, Kościuszko must have been aware that the nobility would eagerly support the uprising and would be a reliable ally. In this sense, his uprising was not aimed against the “old order”. However, it should also be assumed that Kościuszko’s intention was that as a result of the uprising, a new republic would emerge, which would abolish serfdom, grant full rights to acquire property and finally guarantee electoral rights to all property owners and taxpayers. This much can be concluded from the memorial submitted in 1793 by initiators of the Kościuszko Uprising to the French minister Lebrun. The memorial was even more radical in its contents, since it also urged the abolishment of the monarchy, of the senate and even of higher clergy. Above all, however, the document called for “arming the entire nation” [T. Kościuszko, Pisma, H. Mościcki (ed.), Warszawa 1947, p. 74].
Although the radical tone of the document certainly resulted from the desire to quickly win the support of republican France for the cause of the Polish uprising, it may be surmised that it largely reflected the intentions of the commander-in-chief himself, too. It also reflected his vision of a universal nation that would comprise all citizens inhabiting the country irrespective of their status and background – those who wanted to be free and were ready to stand up for their homeland. Only a nation construed in this manner could fulfill its special mission, which resulted from its geopolitical environment; this mission was to promote republicanism in the eastern part of Europe, especially in the context of the threat posed by Tsarist Russia. The memorial explained to the French that without an alliance with the future republican Poland, the French Republic “will be exposed to the constant danger of having its internal peace destroyed by foreign intrigues and will also be the target of constant agitation as long as a powerful despot rules the city on the Neva River…” [Ibidem, p. 71].
Kościuszko confirmed his allegiance to these ideals in his numerous proclamations issued during the uprising as well as in his correspondence. He wanted as many inhabitants of Poland as possible to recognise it as their homeland regardless of their social background, religion or language. This is perfectly clear from his Odezwa do duchowieństwa polskiego, grecko-orientalnego, nieunickiego (“Appeal to the Polish, Eastern Greek, and non-Uniate Clergy”):
“This is right, priests! You are now slaves of Moscow together with all your people. With us, you will be respected – your rite will be valued and your property and income will be the same as those of our own priests. Do not be afraid that the difference in opinions and rites will prevent us from loving you as our brothers and compatriots; indeed, we feel that it is our main duty to make you feel the difference between the hard and unjust rule that you are subject to and the rule of the law of liberty, which we call upon you to choose [Odezwa do duchowieństwa polskiego, grecko-orientalnego, nieunickiego, 1794].
Andrzej Walicki demonstrates that Kościuszko, who was a hero of the American Revolutionary War, already had a modern understanding of the body politic [A. Walicki, Idea narodu w polskiej myśli oświeceniowej, Warszawa 2000, pp. 123–151]. However, traces of a similar approach can already be found in earlier Polish political thought. In general, Walicki identifies them in the broadly understood tradition of noble republicanism. Among the adherents of this tradition, he includes both great reformist writers: Staszic and Kołłątaj who transcended the estate-based limitations of earlier approaches.
It is difficult not to agree with this interpretation. Moreover, looking from the perspective of Kościuszko’s legacy, the ideas of both Polish reformers presage to some extent a new approach to republicanism in general, which gave hope that the greatest obstacles to the development of this tradition could be overcome, and this hope was heightened even more by Kościuszko’s Uprising. It should be reiterated that these obstacles were rooted in the inability of subsequent generations of noble republicans, also those who already had Rousseau’s support, to rise to the challenges that resulted, firstly, from the social constraints inherent in the old concept of the nation and secondly, from the military weakness of old-style republics, which were losing the rivalry with big monarchies that followed a completely different (imperial) political logic. In no other country were these patterns more evident than in Poland. Poland was a large republic at the time, but almost completely incapable of resisting its much stronger monarchical neighbours, which were among the most powerful European empires. The above description of Kościuszko’s standpoint demonstrates that he was fully aware of the shortcomings of the old Poland, which was ruled by the nobility, and saw chances for overcoming them in liberating great masses belonging to estates other than the nobility and in stimulating a strong republican patriotism among them.
Staszic and Kołłątaj were already clearly moving in a similar direction. In his Przestrogi dla Polski (“Warnings for Poland”), the former presented an extremely insightful diagnosis of the development of despotism in Europe. He demonstrated that monarchs, wishing to extend their power, managed to leverage the resentment felt by cities and peasants in connection with their previous humiliations by nobles. However, while promising support for crafts and protection for the people, monarchs were mostly preoccupied with new sources of income, army recruitment and suppressing the resistance of higher social strata. As Staszic stated:
“this is the way in which incautious nobles and clergymen who did not want to share their liberty soon shared in the burghers’ bondage instead. This is the way in which all privileges were taken away from the imprudent nobles and transferred to a single family” [S. Staszic, Przestrogi dla Polski, S. Czarnowski (ed.), Wrocław 2003, p. 73]
Similar deliberations revealed, above all, Staszic’s aversion to monarchism, which he readily identified with despotism. They also reflected a more sociological approach; in this respect, the Polish writer came close to the most insightful critics of aristocratic myopia and egoism such as David Hume and John Adams. However, Staszic’s approach was thoroughly republican; as we can see, he was far from praising the monarch’s alliance with the oppressed classes. The above description clearly demonstrates that in fact, he wished to prevent such an alliance, which in his eyes threatened to annihilate liberty as such. These are the conclusions that should be drawn from his warnings addressed to the Polish nobility. On the first pages of the work discussed here, he wrote:
“Nobles, save yourselves! You are not doomed to lose your liberty and freedom. However, your rights must be made universal and the number of free citizens must increase. You will not save yourself by introducing a partial, so to say patched, constitution. But you will save yourself if you write a completely new constitution that embraces the entire Polish nation. This is an era in which Poland should change completely” [Ibidem, p. 13].
Ideally, the future Commonwealth would guarantee political rights to property owners, both nobles and burghers, and would considerably improve the peasants’ lot. It was to be fully open to newcomers from foreign lands as well. As Staszic stated in his earlier work, which had been published before the Sejm began:
“The law will also enable foreigners and Poles alike, both peasants and noblemen – Catholics, Lutherans, Calvinists, Jews, the Orthodox, and Mahomedans – in short, all people, to settle, take up property and become citizens in Poland” [S. Staszic, Uwagi nad życiem Jana Zamoyskiego, S. Czarnowski (ed.), Wrocław 2005, p. 214]
Thus Staszic believed that it was possible to significantly broaden both the formula of republican citizenship and the foundations of the Polish body politic. He necessarily assumed that the new citizens would form permanent ties with their homeland and would always be ready to defend it. This indeed was the supposed difference between free and monarchical nations; it was not without reason that Staszic devoted so much attention to civic and military education, which was in fact the first topic he touched upon in his Uwagi nad życiem Jana Zamoyskiego (“Remarks on the Life of Jan Zamoyski”).
Hugo Kołłątaj probably held very similar beliefs. In particular, he expressed them fully in his Odezwa do deputacji konstytucyjnej (“Appeal to the Constitutional Deputation”). In this work, he stated his hopes:
“If merciful Providence allowed our age to profit from the great advantages of reason, our nation would become more just than all the others that have ever lived on this earth”.
To that, he added:
“A nobleman would share this power with the burghers because of his love for his homeland and because of his wish to save this land. What could be more splendid than a righteous alliance of free men formed by the constitution in order to protect its liberties and its borders?” [H. Kołłątaj, Odezwa do deputacji konstytucyjnej, in: H. Kołłątaj, Listy anonima i Prawo polityczne narodu polskiego, B. Leśnodorski and H. Wereszycka (eds.), Warszawa 1954, vol. 2, p. 177]
Further, he described his vision of future relations in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth:
“An entirely new people would lend the new strength to the Commonwealth, and we, through fair legislation, would deserve universal admiration in Europe, would be feared by those who wrongly oppress us and would also attract distant friends of liberty who, not knowing where else to hide, travel overseas to the land of Franklin and Washington. Everyone would want to make Poland their homeland: the rich and the poor alike would move to our countries – the former to freely use their property and the latter to eagerly work and earn honest wages” [Ibidem, p. 180].
The quotations cited here show that both reformist writers wanted to believe that Poland could still play a very important role in the history of European republicanism. Kościuszko held a similar belief, although an insurrection was already underway. The statements presented here show a vision of Poland as one of the most important republics in Europe, which would attract numerous friends of liberty from the entire continent, would be open to people of different faiths and backgrounds, and finally would promote republicanism in the eastern part of Europe. It should also be stressed that – as presented by Staszic and especially by Kołłątaj who was the author of one of the most important works of the era of the Four-Year Sejm, i.e. Listy anonima (“Anonymous Letters”) – this image already involved a novel concept of citizenship and liberty. Although the nobles were to remain the first and foremost estate of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, they were to be joined by the bourgeoisie. In this respect, both writers referred to the class of owners – landowners, owners of factories or citizens who paid sufficient taxes. Therefore one might say that they strived to base the Polish idea of citizenship on pre-capitalist social relationships. However, owing to broader guarantees of personal freedom (and also the protection of property), which Kołłątaj already construed in terms of natural rights, political rights could be open – at least in the future, especially in the case of the rights of burghers – to all enterprising inhabitants of the Commonwealth, including peasants who had been liberated from serfdom. This solution followed logically from the most fundamental philosophical assumptions concerning human liberty, which revealed Kołłątaj’s attachment to ideals that stemmed, so to say, both from the Enlightenment and from Christianity. In the Listy anonima, he demanded in any case to give back to the farmer:
“what we have sacrilegiously taken away from him, violating both divine and human laws, i.e. we must give him back his personal liberty and that of his hands”.
Further, pointing to yet more reasons why this solution should be adopted, he stated that as a result:
“this industrious people … will redouble its efforts and through its sincere attachment to the land will incomparably enrich the entire society, increase our prosperity, love our homeland and know that it is its own while today this people is treated no different than cattle ” [H. Kołłątaj, Listy anonima, in: H. Kołłątaj, Listy anonima i Prawo polityczne narodu polskiego, B. Leśnodorski and H. Wereszycka (eds.), Warszawa 1954, vol. 1, p. 280].
Although many elements of this concept required further refinement and both reformers had to reckon with the resistance of the nobility, it gave hope for a rapid introduction of a thorough reform of socio-economic relationships in the territories of the Commonwealth.
These changes were also to be accompanied by political reforms, which were precisely outlined by both writers. Generally speaking, both Staszic and Kołłątaj wanted to make the parliament’s work more effective. The Sejm was to be kept under constant supervision of citizens (thanks to the institution of binding instructions, which was highly valued by Rousseau), but also ready to act at any moment, including without limitation to exercise control over the executive. Both reformers, however, were willing to make a certain compromise with the monarchy in this area, since they categorically demanded succession to the throne to be introduced in Poland. I will return to this critical point later; here, I will limit myself to one observation: both writers’ concepts of the future political system reveal some serious inconsistencies indeed, but the findings they both make in their most significant works demonstrate that they wanted to place ruling the state and the responsibility for its fate in the hands of the nation and its representatives, and ultimately in the hands of the officials who are subject to them. This is particularly clear from their vision of citizens who should be very active and devoted to the affairs of the state. Kołłątaj in particular combined this approach with his vision of new economic and social relationships which were to be based on ideals of diligence and entrepreneurship. As he argued, a republic, which is underpinned by the transfer of political power to property owners, must fail if it is not built by industrious people. As he argued:
“a man who is sluggish, lazy and unused to work will always act to the detriment of a republic. He will not hold the helm of government with sufficient strength and constant vigilance; he will give free rein to lawlessness, debauchery and softness, and thus will upset the entire mechanism and hinder its smooth operation… [H. Kołłątaj, Listy anonima, in: H. Kołłątaj, Listy anonima i Prawo polityczne narodu polskiego, vol. 2, p. 18].
Thus Staszic and Kołłątaj, and later Kościuszko as well, presented visions for the development of the Commonwealth that were already very modern and based on the ideals of a more universal republicanism that included in any case not just the nobility, but burghers as well; in a broader sense, or ultimately, it was meant to include the entire population. In this sense, they already transcended the limitations of the noble tradition, potentially depriving potential supporters of an alliance between the monarch and the dispossessed classes of their arguments. In a sense, they also confirmed that the heritage of noble liberty did not need to be rejected entirely and that it could provide a good basis for the further necessary modernisation of the state and, ultimately, might give hope that future threats from imperial monarchies could be repulsed. Of course, one of the first conditions for success was that the nobility needed to revise its attitudes – it had to be willing to share its political privileges with the burghers and also to comprehend that the peasants’ situation was terrible and that serfdom must be abolished, if only gradually.
Against this background the ideas advocated by their ideological opponents (referred to as noble republicans here), who criticised in particular the idea of succession to the throne, looked much less impressive. Even the most enlightened representatives of that tradition who were inspired by the Considérations sur le gouvernement de Pologne, such as Adam Wawrzyniec Rzewuski, were not ready to put forward demands for even partial social reforms, perhaps preferring to postpone them until later. Given that in the reformists’ thought the issue of social reform was inseparably linked to strengthening the defensive capabilities of the nation, it can be assumed that the noble republican tradition, which sidestepped the former, did not offer much with respect to the latter either. However, one of the opponents of succession to the throne, Wojciech Turski, appeared to have overcome these limitations, at least in his rhetoric, and soon (long before the uprising had broken out) became known as an advocate of collaboration between republican France and Poland against the monarchies that threatened both countries. Nevertheless, the ideological camp that he continued to defend during the most heated debates in the Four Years’ Sejm did not fully manage to dispel all doubts that emerged in this respect. While the noble republicans followed Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s suggestions on many subjects, especially warning against the introduction of hereditary monarchy and against depriving nobles who did not hold property of political rights, they failed to exhibit the social sensitivity that was characteristic of Rousseau at the culminating moment of the dispute on the future of the republic. Although Rousseau’s Considérations are far from radical in this respect, it is already possible to interpret them as calling for gradually expanding the scope of the nobility as an estate. In this sense, it was Rousseau’s thought rather than that of Kołłątaj and Staszic (who both demanded that burghers be given political rights and that the peasants’ lot be improved on a different basis) that could have become the foundation for transmitting the legacy of noble republicanism in a comprehensive and model manner. Significantly, however, the idea was not developed at that time.
However, I would refrain from passing unequivocal judgments on the development potential of the noble republican camp, which was critical of the reformists [This tradition was assessed more critically by Anna Grześkowiak-Krwawicz (O formę rządu czy o rząd dusz? Publicystyka polityczna Sejmu Czteroletniego, Warszawa 2000, in particular pp. 144–145, 236–237, 378)]. After all, several representatives of this tradition, and in any case Adam Rzewuski and Turski, were already reaching for political narratives that were typical of the Age of Enlightenment. Perhaps the thought they represented, which drew copiously upon the Considérations sur le gouvernement de Pologne, but also took into account the generally conservative attitude of the nobility, was not yet ready to put forward more courageous social demands. It must be remembered that unlike the reformers, and particularly Kołłątaj, who was ready to grant to the King the right of veto, albeit a limited one, in his Prawo polityczne narodu polskiego (“Political Law of the Polish Nation”), the noble republicans were not ready for any doctrinal compromises with monarchism.
From the point of view of the republican doctrine, their standpoint was more coherent. However, any comparison between this standpoint and the reformist thought of Staszic and Kołłątaj leads to the conclusion that the latter two writers, who attempted to resolve certain social and geopolitical challenges, could have contributed more to the further development of Polish republicanism. On the other hand, the concessions made to the royalist position, which are even more evident in the more compromising Constitution of May 3 [see R. Butterwick, Konstytucja 3 Maja na tle nowożytnej Europy, in: Lex est Rex in Polonia et in Lithuania... Tradycje polityczno-prawne Rzeczypospolitej – doświadczenie i dziedzictwo, A. Jankiewicz (ed.), Warszawa 2008, pp. 145–157], can be seen in terms of purely tactical moves that were forced by political considerations. Obviously, from the republican perspective, these concessions must clearly be criticised, since they demonstrated to some extent the lack of faith in the potential of “pure” republicanism. However, a possible future departure from them would not present any doctrinal difficulties, while the concepts of citizenship and liberty developed by Kołłątaj and Staszic could have provided the foundations for a new, and potentially very dynamic, republican experience. Those concepts would certainly significantly alter the essence of Polish republicanism, but one could still consider it a continuation of earlier heritage to some extent.
The noble republican tradition, which was critical of the reformist camp, did not offer such development opportunities, and even if it did not rule them out entirely (as in the case of Rzewuski and Turski), it failed to transcend its own limitations. That tradition, however, also had a second facet. By that I mean many of its more conservative representatives, as best exemplified by Seweryn Rzewuski. This current not only gave no hope for modernising and extending the formula of Polish republicanism; it also appeared to completely deny the possibility of the Commonwealth being independent from one of its monarchical neighbours. In any case, this could explain the support of many proponents of this current of noble republicanism for the Targowica Confederation [more on this subject: see R. Lis, Szlachecki republikanizm, Rousseau i Targowica, czyli o różnych sposobach odniesienia do problemu słabości imperialnej ustroju republikańskiego, in: Między realizmem a apostazją narodową. Koncepcje prorosyjskie w polskiej myśli politycznej, M. Zakrzewski (ed.), Kraków 2015, pp. 11–37]. Of course, similar allegations cannot be levelled against all republican critics of succession to the throne, just as such critics cannot be said to have completely rejected the inspiration of the Enlightenment. However, Enlightenment ideas, and especially those that were later to underpin the doctrine of human and civil rights and thus gave hope for the development of a new republican heritage, exerted much more influence on the work and attitudes of reformers such as Staszic, Kołłątaj and Kościuszko. It also appears that since Polish thinkers of that time failed to develop the social message of the Considérations sur le gouvernement de Pologne, it was the reformers’ findings that offered the most promising possibilities for the further evolution of Polish republicanism.